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Abstract
Immigrant groups that are marginalized in their host countries are dispropor-
tionately more likely to have their citizenship applications rejected. It is not readily
obvious whether this disparity is due to prejudice on the part of decisionmakers or
due to applicant di¤erences in meeting naturalization standards. To address this
question, I develop a simple model of a council deciding whether to grant applicants
citizenship. The model implies an empirical test for relative prejudice using average
applicant group rejection rates. Using Switzerland as a case study, I apply the test
to newly collected data from six large municipalities. In ve municipalities, the
test cannot reject the hypothesis of no relative prejudice with respect to country of
origin. The rejection pattern of the sixth municipality is consistent with prejudice.
The model illustrates that the underlying mechanism in the decisionmaking process
has bearing on the inference of prejudice from empirical data.
University of Basel, Faculty of Business and Economics, Peter Merian-Weg 6, 4002 Basel, Switzer-
land, and ETH Zurich, CER Center of Economic Research, ZUE F11, Zurichbergstrasse 18, 8092 Zurich
(e-mail: dragan.ilic@unibas.ch). I am grateful to Georg Nöldeke, George Sheldon, Alois Stutzer, and
Brigitte Guggisberg for their help on this project. I would like to thank all participating councils for
their time and e¤ort in providing the data. Funding for this research was generously provided by the
WWZ Forum and the National Centre of Competence in Research "On the Move".
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1 Introduction
For immigrants, naturalization can be described as a last stepping stone of settling in
in their host country. Granting and receiving citizenship are not solely symbolic acts.
Citizenship irreversibly opens the gate to a nations political and territorial association.
Citizens can vote and have an indenite right of stay. Citizenship also often comes with
higher wages and improved access to the labor market (Fougère and Sa, 2009). The
benets of citizenship are not restricted to the naturalized; there is also evidence that nat-
uralizations may improve the policital and social integration of immigrants (Steinhardt,
2012; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono, 2015). Naturalizations thus have the
potential to a¤ect a myriad of political, social, and economic settings in host countries.
That potential is especially palpable in Europe, Northern America, and Oceania, where
every tenth resident was not born where they live (United Nations, 2016).
Whenever minorities are at such mercy of decisionmakers, disputes about prejudice
tend to crop up: housing, jobs, policing, and the justice system are just a few exam-
ples. The concern in naturalizations is whether the eligibility of marginalized applicants
striving for citizenship is measured by the same yardstick. However, despite the gravitas
of the decision, not much is known about systematic prejudice in granting citizenships.
This contrasts with a well-established literature on discrimination in other arenas.1 But
1The following attempt gives a tiny glimpe into the literature. Unless otherwise noted, the cited
studies investigate data from the United States. For discrimination in housing, see Zhao, Ondrich and
Yinger (2006), who focus on real estate brokers, and the study by Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) for
Swedens rental market. A comprehensive recent study by Ewens, Tomlin and Wang (2014) pinpoints
to statistical discrimination rather than taste-based discrimination in the rental appartment market.
For surveys about ethnic discrimination in labor markets, see Neumark (2013) and Lang and Lehmann
(2012). Research on discrimination in policing spans from the seminal paper by Knowles, Persico and
Todd (2001) until a very recent and controversial study by Fryer (2016) on police violence. Ayres and
Waldfogel (1994) present early evidence for discrimination at the bail bond setting stage, and Alesina
and La Ferrara (2014) reject the hypothesis of no prejudice in capital sentencing. Shayo and Zussman
(2011) present evidence for judicial ingroup bias in Israel. Rich data is key in empirical analyses: More
evidence on discrimination comes from experiments selling iPods in local online classied advertisements
(Doleac and Stein, 2013) and from a job market eld experiment that implemented changes in the cost of
discrimination during required collaborations (Heddegaard and Tyran, 2016). Sports provide excellent
data: Price and Wolfers (2010) study racial discrimination among basketball referees in the NBA, and
Parsons et al. (2011) study prejudice among baseball umpires in the MLB.
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there is no reason to expect that naturalizations are immune to prejudice, nor is there a
lack of controversy. For example, an ongoing lawsuit by Muslim applicants in the United
States raises complaints against Immigration Services.2 This is just the latest tip of the
iceberg. There has been a wave of lawsuits related to naturalizations in the United States
in the last ten years.3 In Germany, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination expressed its discomfort with application questions biased against
Muslim applicants (CERD, 2008). In Switzerland, applicants from Turkey and former
Yugoslavia, both minority groups, have long been suspected to be at a disadvantage by
sometimes being rejected at will (Helbling, 2008). Yet more controversy could be loom-
ing. Within the scope of its immigration reform, the US government has proposed to
provide a path to citizenship for its 11 million undocumented workers (The White House,
O¢ ce of the Press Secretary, 2013).
One reason for the dearth of research on prejudice in naturalizations is scant empirical
data. Countries usually only publish aggregate data of granted citizenships, at best
stratied by country of origin. Unravelling prejudice, however, requires more data. Lower
naturalization rates or higher rejection rates for certain groups, for instance, may have
many accountable causes. For one, marginalized groups tend to face larger socio-economic
disadvantages, so it is conceivable that they are less likely to be eligible and would fail
to meet naturalization standards more often than other applicant groups. Accounting
for such di¤erences in patterns of eligibility is key if one wants to test rigorously for
prejudice. With rich microlevel data one could attribute di¤erences in naturalization
outcomes to the e¤ects of di¤erences in measured applicant characteristics. Not all these
characteristics, however, are usually observable to researchers.
An exception that managed to pursue this very strategy is the study by Hainmueller
and Hangartner (2013) for Switzerland. Hainmueller and Hangartner collected data on
2Arapi et al v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services et al, 4:2016cv00692, E.D. Mo May 18, 2016
3For example, Tarek Hamdi v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Service et al,
5:2010cv00894, C.D. Cal, June 16, 2010. The online database of the Justia Corporate Center (dock-
ets.justia.com) list several thousands lawsuits related to US naturalization applications since 2004.
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closed ballot votings in hundreds of municipalities, administrative divisions of the state
that have the subsidiary authority to grant Swiss citizenship to their local residents. By
tediously codifying voting leaet information of 2,400 anonymous naturalization refer-
endums from 1970-2003, Hainmueller and Hangartner gathered evidence that supports
the suspicion of disadvantaged minority applicants. However, the specic research design
proves problematic because it is germane to that particular empirical setting. Courts
have since outlawed the controversial policy. Municipalities can still decide locally, but
Switzerland now employs, in line with most other countries, councils for evaluating nat-
uralization applications to ensure privacy and justiability for the applicants. In assess-
ing their applications, councils usually also conduct personal interviews. Switzerlands
regime change, then, exemplies the general empirical di¢ culty in detecting prejudice in
naturalizations. Not only does the evaluation policy render research access to microlevel
data next to impossible, it also makes the omitted variable bias problem appear in the
empirical analysis. Signals of eligibility in personal exchanges are di¢ cult to observe, let
alone easily quantiable. A viable research design to test for prejudice in naturalizations
has thus remained at large.
This paper addresses this gap and develops a simple model of a decisionmaking process
in naturalizations that implies an outcome test for prejudice. The model posits that a
principals decision whether to grant citizenship will take into account any signal that
is informative of an applicants eligibility. That makes the rate of rejected applications
indicative of the required expected eligibility for being granted citizenship. The model
demonstrates how the rank order pattern of these rates across various groupings of prin-
cipals and applicant groups can be tested for prejudice. More concretely, in the model
principals weigh the benet of naturalizing qualied applicants against the cost of mis-
takenly naturalizing unqualied applicants. In addition to country of origin, a principal
observes a noisy but informative signal about the merit of each of its applicants. Qualied
applicants are more likely than unqualied ones to send a favorable signal. In this set-
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ting, the principals optimal decision is characterized by setting a threshold of expected
qualication. Only an applicant whose signal exceeds this standard will be granted cit-
izenship. Di¤erent principals may use di¤erent standards, but the model implies that if
principals are not prejudiced against applicants based on, say, some applicantscountry
of origin, the rank order of the rejection rates, grouped by country of origin, should be the
same for every principal. It is this variation in strictness of granting citizenship that the
model exploits (and requires) when empirically testing for prejudice. The next section
shows that such patterns are often observable in naturalization data. A nice feature of
the model is that it does not require knowledge of all the applicant characteristics that
are taken into account by the decicionmaking councils; in particular those characteristics
that are typically not available to researchers.
The model adds to the ongoing research on modeled outcome tests of discrimination,
which originates back to Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001). In their paper, police o¢ cers
and motorists strategically interact in the context of motor vehicle searches. To test
prejudice among the police, Knowles, Persico, and Todd compare the search success
rates of white, black, and Hispanic motorists. Anwar and Fang (2006) generalize that
seminal model and drop two key assumptions; the requirement that motorists respond
to the probability of being searched and the assumption of a monolithic police force.
Discrimination in healthcare is the subjet in Anwar and Fang (2013), who investigate
error patterns in emergency room visit discharges. In their model, physisians have to
decide whether to keep emergency room patients in the hospital for further investigation
or whether to send them home. The test for prejudice against patients of di¤erent races
relies on the comparison of their bounce back rates - the probability that a patient
had been misdiagnosed and needed to revisit an emergency room shortly after being
mistakenly discharged. Parole release data have also been exploited in modeled outcome
tests. Mechoulan and Sahuguet (2015) and Anwar and Fang (2015) put forth models to
test for prejudice using rates of recidivism grouped by prisoner race. Finally, Alesina and
5
La Ferrara (2014) adapt Anwar and Fangs (2006) model to investigate capital sentencings
and let courts minimize type I and type II errors in their rulings. Their model implies that
with unbiased courts, conditional on defendants race the error rate should be independent
of victims race. What is common to all modeled outcome tests is that they rely on
rational choice behavior and, on that account, manage to get by without microlevel data.
In general, average grouped outcome data su¢ ce for the empirical tests. The model in
this paper falls into line and builds upon Anwar and Fangs (2006) framework.
Using Switzerland as a case study, I apply my model to a landmark decision in nat-
uralization law. In 2003, the Swiss Federal Court declared closed ballot voting illegal
and mandated that councils, usually sta¤ed with locally elected policicians, are to assess
the eligibility of the local applications. In another study, Hainmueller and Hangartner
(2017) show that this large scale of institutional change raised the municipal naturaliza-
tion rates in Switzerland dramatically, even in municipalities that did not switch regimes.4
I raise new application data from six large Swiss municipalities and exploit the within-
municipality variation in rejection rate patterns before and after the 2003 ruling.5 That
is, for each municipality, I compare its rejection rate rank order before and after 2003.
The unexpected regime change ensures that possible di¤erences in the quality of the
applicant pool are not confounding the test results. The test for prejudice cannot reject
the hypothesis of no prejudice in ve of the six municipalities. One municipality shows
evidence that is consistent with prejudice. Finally, the model has a key testable implica-
tion - as the number of applications rise, the rejection rate increases as well. This rests
upon the assumption that a rise in applications is driven by less eligible applicants. The
empirical results support this prediction.
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 describes international naturalization policies
and highlights considerable variation in strictness even within countries, a data pattern
required for an empirical implementation of the test. The model and the test for prejudice
4I will revert to the Swiss naturalization studies in more detail in the next section.
5No Swiss municipality publishes information on rejections on their own.
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are presented in Section 3. Section 4 proceeds with the Swiss case study and describes the
new data on rejection rates. Section 5 presents the results from the empirical analysis.
Section 5 discusses and concludes.
2 Naturalization Policies Around the World
In countries that do not follow the ius soli principle, obtaining citizenship usually requires
an active engagement even on the part of those immigrants that were born in their
host countries. Naturalization procedures are country-specic, and these policies vary
in strictness. For instance, in the European Union, despite attaining corresponding
rights in all member states upon naturalization, policies range from actively promoting
naturalization to restrictive access. These degrees are not cast in stone but change
over time, again depending on the country (Bauböck et al., 2006). Whereas Belgium
and Germany have strived for more liberal practices in the recent past, Greece and
Italy have adopted increasingly conservative attitudes. This cross-sectional variation
in strictness is not conned to the country level. Helbling (2010) shows that within
countries, naturalization rates and the strictness of the interpretation of the national
citizenship laws di¤er greatly among administrative divisions. In Germany, this holds
true at the Länder level (Dornis, 2001; Hagedorn, 2001; Hailbronner, 2006). Austria,
too, shows variations at its regional level (Cinar and Waldrauch, 2006). For the United
States, North (1987) concludes that the implementation of the naturalization procedures
vary a great deal between district o¢ ces. Helbling and Kriesi (2004) and Hainmueller and
Hangartner (2013) reveal striking di¤erences among municipalities in Switzerland. And
even notoriously centralized states like France do not seem to be immune from distinct
implementations of its national law (Weil, 2004).
The Swiss case lends itself particularly well for empirical research on naturalizations
because the political system is characterized by a emphatic devotion to federalism and
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subsidiarity. Helbling (2008) and Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) provide compre-
hensive overviews on Switzerlands citizenship policy. Here I only highlight the features
which resonate with the model developped in the next section. Citzenship in Switzerland
is regarded as an act of state that is to be primarily delegated to the lowest of the three
political levels, the municipality. Interested immigrants have to apply in their munici-
pality of residence. The requests are forwarded to the cantonal and federal level, which
conduct formal checks whether the application fullls the legal requirements.6 Upon pos-
itive feedback, the tricky part begins. The applicant has to convince the municipalitys
council of his or her merit. Among other things, the councils decision is based on legal
background checks, the applicants characteristics, and the personal impression during
face to face interviews. Integration to Swiss life, as measured by familiarity with local
laws, traditions, and customs, is the central pillar in the assessment. These factors are
often proxied by language skills, job status, or even hobbies. It falls to each council to
which extent these requirements need to be met in order to be granted citizenship. This
autonomy helps explain the varying naturalization rates at regional levels.
Before 2003, in hundreds of municipalities these decisions were discretionary and
untraceable because closed ballot votings were used to decide on naturalization applica-
tions. That is, Swiss citizens could cast their vote on any naturalization application in
the municipality were living in. Only applicants with a popular majority of "yes" votes
received Swiss citizenship. This controversial policy would turn out to be immensely
useful for resarch. Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) collected data on 2,400 recorded
naturalization referenda held between 1970 and 2003 in 44 Swiss municipalities using such
closed ballots. Their analysis shows that, despite accounting for a battery of applicant
characteristics that are commonly deemed relevant for naturalization, the proportion of
"no" votes were about 40% higher on average for applicants from former Yugoslavia and
6Articles 14 and 15 of the Swiss Naturalization law leave some room for interpretation but list the
following basic requirements: Overall 12 years of residency, integration into and familiarity with Swiss
customs and tradition, adherence to Swiss law, and lack of threat for the internal and external security
of Switzerland.
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Turkey in comparison to applicants from rich European countries like Germany or the
UK. Lower socio-economic credentials in form of occupational skills, educational attain-
ment, or length of residency matter as well, but not in equal measure. Hainmueller and
Hangartner attribute the discriminatory treatment to the lack of accountability associ-
ated with the nature of closed ballots. This attribution is consistent with the results
of their follow-up study, where they compare naturalization rates before and after 2003
(Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2017). That year the Swiss Federal Court declared closed
ballot voting illegal for naturalization applications. The ban was based on two grounds.
First, the right to appeal rejected applications was not ensured. Closed ballots, by de-
nition, lack the basis for any contestable justication. Second, the court disapproved of
the severe lack of privacy in the evaluation of the applicants, who had to reveal detailed
background information to all eligible voters, usually in form of detailed leaets (the very
information that was harnessed for research). Hainmueller and Hangartner show that the
switch to elected councils increased the naturalization rates of the formerly discriminated
applicants on average by 50%, more so in municipalities with a high vote share of the
conservative Swiss Peoples Party (SVP), and even in municipalities that did not switch
their naturalization regime. This is interpreted as evidence of discrimination on the as-
sumption that once accountable legislators instead of anonymous voters are in charge of
handling naturalizations, indulgence of discriminatory preferences become more costly
and thus less likely.
Heterogeneity in strictness in the application of the law are a widespread feature
of naturalization policies. In the next section I advance a model that exploits these
variations to develop a test for prejudice. The model is based on the premise that in
screening their applicants, councils take into consideration any signals that are infor-
mative of actual qualication for citizenship. Chiswick and Miller (2008) suggest that
individual-level characteristics systematically relate to citizenship status. Duration of
residence, command of the host countrys o¢ cial language, and, to some extent, higher
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levels of skill (indexed by education attainment and occupation), all link to naturaliza-
tion, although Dronkers and Vink (2012) put the role of skill in perspective. The highest
explanatory power for naturalization according to Chiswick and Miller are country of
origin characteristics, even more so than individual characteristics. This is in accord
with Dronkers and Vink (2012) and DeVoretz and Pivnenko (2005), who show that im-
migrants from poor or politically unstable countries are more likely to naturalize. My
model assumes that deciding councils condense this individual and group information
into an index of expected eligibility.
3 A Model of Naturalization Decisions
3.1 The Model
Consider two councils that separately evaluate their resident immigrants which apply for
naturalization. Let c 2 fA;Bg denote the councils. In each council, there are continuums
of applicants grouped into country of origin e 2 fR;Fg, where R and F stand for related
and foreign, respectively.7 Suppose that among applicants of origin e, a fraction e is
objectively unqualied for naturalization. I allow for the possibility that the unobservable
characteristics among applicants from di¤erent countries of origin may di¤er. Councils
therefore evaluate the merit for naturalization based on the applicants origin and a
myriad of observable applicant characteristics. A council may consider information such
as gender, age, number of children, language skills, familiarity with local habits and law,
duration of residence, employment status, or level of education and income. Importantly,
a council also processes characteristics that are di¢ cult to observe for a researcher, such
as demeanor or congeniality during personal interviews. Let us assume that a council
condenses all this information into a one-dimensional index  2 [0; 1] which reects the
likelihood that an applicant is unqualied for naturalization. This index is randomly
7The model readily extends to n councils and m immigrant groups.
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drawn from a continuous density function f eu () if the applicant is actually unqualied.
If the applicant is qualied, the index is drawn from f eq (). For this index to be indicative
of qualication, the two densities are assumed to satisfy the strict monotone likelihood
ratio property, that is, for e 2 fR;Fg, f eu () =f eq () is strictly increasing in . This implies
F eq () < F
e
u() for all . In words, higher values of the signal  are more likely if the
applicant is unqualied. Some applicants may produce signals which will unambiguously
lead to rejections, such as a criminal record. I thus assume an unbounded likelihood ratio:
f eu () =f
e
q () ! +1 as  ! 1. After interviewing an applicant of country of origin e
with signal , a council decides whether to grant citizenship or not. While councils only
see imperfect signals during the course of the application, they do eventually realize
whether their decision was correct. Councils derive the benet b(c; e) from naturalizing a
qualied applicant. At the same time, councils bear the marginal cost t when mistakenly
naturalizing an unqualied applicant. Note that the benet can depend both on the
deciding council and on the applicants country of origin.8 Councils may have a taste
to prefer applicants of certain origin to be naturalized (or conversely, dislike applicants
of certain origin to become citizens). Based on this taste, a given council whose benet
depends on the applicants country of origin is said to be prejudiced:
b(c; R) 6= b(c; F )
On the other hand, councils may derive di¤erent levels of benet in general from nat-
uralizing qualied applicants, levels that do not depend on country of origin. Such
di¤erences in benets could stem, for instance, from varying identity preferences based
on group distinction or high council standards associated with the merit of citizenship.
Dene councils to be heterogenous if
b(A; e) 6= b(B; e)
8For the sake of simplicity, I assume t to be independent of council and country of origin.
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for some e. Councils that derive little benet from naturalization are said to be strict.
Likewise, councils that derive a lot of benet are said to be lenient. It is easy to see
that heterogenous councils do not imply prejudice against a given country of origin. By
the same token, homogenous councils do not imply the lack of prejudice as both councils
might equally prefer or dislike applicants from certain backgrounds.
3.2 Theoretical Implications
Denote by U the undesirable event that a naturalized applicant turns out to be unqual-
ied. The probability of this event depends both on the signal  observed during the
interview and on country of origin. Following Bayesrule, this probability is given by
Pr(U j e; ) = ef
e
u ()
ef eu () + (1  e)f eu ()
. (1)
The monotone likelihood ratio property implies that this probability strictly increases
in . Since the signal is informative, a higher level correctly reects an increase in the
mistake probability. Now consider the decision problem of a council faced with this
information:
max fb(c; e) [1  Pr(U j e; )]  tPr(U j e; ); 0g
The rst term describes the expected benet from naturalizing a qualied applicant minus
the cost of mistakenly naturalizing an unqualied applicant. Not naturalizing yields a
benet of zero. The costs associated with the naturalization process itself are considered
xed and are thus disregarded. Thus, the council does best to naturalize if and only if
b(c; e) [1  Pr(U j e; )] > tPr(U j e; ),
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in words, whenever the expected benet of naturalizing outweighs the expected cost.
This naturalization condition reduces to
Pr(U j e; ) < b(c; e)
b(c; e) + t
(2)
Intuitively, a high benet of naturalization makes for a riskier behavior because the
council accepts a higher probability of mistakes. On the other hand, high costs of making
mistakes do not leave a lot of room for suspicious signals. Because Pr(U j e; ) is strictly
increasing in , the naturalization condition described by (2) implies that the council
grants citizenship if and only if
  (c; e);
where the naturalization threshold (c; e) is pinned down by
Pr(U j e; (c; e)) = b(c; e)
b(c; e) + t
. (3)
The applicant sending the signal (c; e) is called the marginal applicant who is deemed
just worthy enough to be granted citizenship. Any applicant with a higher signal than
this standard will be rejected. Likewise, any applicant with a lower signal will be natural-
ized. It is straightforward to see that (c; e) is strictly increasing in b(c; e) and strictly
decreasing in t. The higher the benet of naturalization, the worse the qualication
standard is allowed to become. In turn, higher costs imply a stricter expected quality
conveyed by the signal. The signal threshold (c; e) determines the average rejection
rate of council c against applicants of origin e in equilibrium:
r(c; e) = e [1  F eu((c; e))] + (1  e)

1  F eq ((c; e))

(4)
This rejection rate is monotonically decreasing in (c; e): The worse the signal is allowed
to become, the less applicants are rejected. Note that a council that is not prejudiced
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might neverthelesss use di¤erent signal thresholds for the applicant groups. An un-
prejudiced council does not aim to set equal signal thresholds but equal probabilities of
qualication for the marginal applicants. If one applicant group is known to have a larger
unqualied fraction or if the signal  is distributed di¤erently between the two applicant
groups, councils take this information into account. This implication is an inherent part
of models of statistical discrimination. Equation (1) illustrates that because the appli-
cants qualication is not perfectly observed, a councils optimal assessment about the
qualication of a given applicant does not solely depend on that applicants signal. The
assessment also considers the fraction of qualied applicants in that group. Also note
that if councils are homogenous they all derive the same benet from a given applicant
group. In that case, the threshold condition (3) implies that unbiased councils set the
same signal threshold for this group. Consequently, the rejection rate dened by (4)
against this particular applicant group would be the same for both councils.
Based on this insight, consider the following simple transitivity example. Assume
b(A;R) > b(B;R) applies so that council A derives a larger benet from naturalizing
related immigrants than council B does. If the two councils are not prejudiced, it must be
true that b(A;R) = b(A;F ) and b(B;R) = b(B;F ). It immediately follows that b(A;F ) >
b(B;F ) so that council A also derives a larger benet from naturalizing immigrants from
group F . In other words, if the councils are heterogenous but not prejudiced, the ranking
of b(A; e) and b(B; e) does not depend on country of origin. What can be said about the
signal thresholds? We know that (c; e) is strictly increasing in b(c; e), so above example
implies (A;R) > (B;R) and (A;F ) > (B;F ). Moreover, because the rejection
rate r(c; e) is monotonically decreasing in (c; e), it also follows that r(A;R) < r(B;R)
and r(A;F ) < r(B;F ). The rejection rates of the lenient council A will be lower for
both applicant groups. To sum up, if councils are heterogenous but not prejudiced, the
ranking of the rejection rates across councils does not depend on country of origin. If this
rank order is violated, we can deduce relative prejudice among the councils. However,
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because there is no objective rank order that denes impartiality, one cannot pinpoint
the discriminating council.
3.3 An Outcome Test for Prejudice in Naturalization
Decisions
The model provides a test for prejudice that is applicable with average outcome data.
This test can be implemented even when researchers have no access to the signals which
are observed by the councils when deciding whether to grant citizenship. The theoretical
implications predict that under the null hypothesis of no relative prejudice among the
councils, the rank order of the average rejection rates for a given country of origin e across
councils c 2 fA;Bg does not depend on country of origin e 2 fR;Fg. Heterogeneity
across councils is thus a prerequisite for the empirical application of the test.
3.4 Discussing the Model
Outcome tests have notorious issues with infra-marginality. Generally one cannot infer
disparate treatment from (average) outcome data. Instead, it is the outcome of marginal
decisionmaking that is informative of animus.9 It is useful to elaborate on this distinc-
tion. Recall that the councils only naturalize applicants with a signal that is below the
naturalization threshold (3) for that group. In other words, a council only naturalizes
applicants who are deemed qualied enough. If a council is not biased, at the margin it
requires the same probability of qualication no matter the country of origin. But we
know that depending on the group-specic distributions of the signals and the fraction
of unqualied applicants in that group, the average rejection rates may vary despite the
same marginal decisionmaking process. Since empirical data only provides information
on average outcomes, the infra-marginality issue poses a key obstacle for inferences of
disparate treatment via outcome data.
9For a extended description of this issue see Becker (1993), Yinger (1996), or Ayres (2002).
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The proposed outcome test in this paper circumvents this issue. The test does not
directly compare the average rejection rates for a given country of origin across councils.
Instead, it makes use of the rankings implied by the model, an indirect identication
strategy so to speak. These rankings exploit the simple fact that under the model as-
sumptions, the direction in which the average rejection rate moves is unambiguously
determined by the direction in which the council adjusts the required marginal probabil-
ity of qualication. A higher (lower) marginal probability of qualication always implies
a higher (lower) average rejection rate. Put simply, the average moves with the marginal
because they are strictly monotonically related. So although we cannot infer directly if
the required marginal probabilites of qualication are equal when looking at the average
rejection rates, we do know which rank order of the average rejection rates would reject
the hypothesis that the marginal probabilities are equal.
This identication strategy bears a caveat. Like in Anwar and Fangs (2006) test
for racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches, there is some leeway of prejudice in the
average rejection rates due to the ordinal nature of the test. Imagine that one council is
prejudiced against applicants from a certain country of origin, which raises the rejection
rate. But the proposed test will fail to detect prejudice if this rate remains within the
allowed range which is consistent with the null hypothesis of an independent rank order
across councils. This is the case if the prejudice is not too strong, where strong is relative
and depends on the magnitude of prejudice required for a violation of the rank orders and
on the di¤erences in benet across councils. The larger these di¤erences, the more leeway
there is. In statistical terms, there is a high probability of a type-II error, not rejecting
the null hypothesis of no prejudice. All the same, if the test does indicate prejudice, it
does so with high condence.
There also looms an empirical issue. The tests assumes that all councils face pools
of applicants which are sampled from the same population. This assumption may not
hold. For instance, if one municipality attracts particularly high-skilled immigrants from
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Turkey, rejection rates in that municipality may be lower because of the higher eligibility,
not because its council is more lenient. In the case study below, my identication strategy
circumvents this pitfall by testing within municipalities over time. The sudden change
of the naturalization regime in 2003 mandated by the Swiss Federal Court ensures that
councils face pools of applicants which are sampled from the very same population.
Because a naturalization application takes at least two years to go through, applicants
could not have anticipated the regime change, so any observable changes in rejection
rates cannot be explained by a change in the application pool prior to the ruling.
4 Data
There are a lot of municipalities in Switzerland, and most of them are small. In 2016, with
a population count of 8 million residents, there were 2294 municipalities in Switzerland.
The mean municipality had 3600 residents, the median municipality had 1400 residents.
A quarter of the population has no Swiss passport. Still, naturalizations are not an
everday occurrence. Roughly 40,000 immigrants - two percent of the foreign population
- are currently naturalized in Switzerland every year. The regional fragmentation and
the naturalization rates suggest that rejection numbers by municipality and country of
origin, are likely to have, on average, a low frequency.
In order to ensure a su¢ cient number of observations for the empirical test, I invited
all Swiss municipalities in the German and French speaking parts with at least 20000
citizens as of 2010 to list their total number of both granted and rejected citizenship
applications by country of origin on an annual basis from 1998-2011. Of the 35 contacted
municipalities, six managed to provide su¢ cient data, henceforth dubbed municipalities
A to F. This seems like a low response rate, but almost no contacted municipality had
the requested data at their immediate disposal. In contrast to granted citizenships,
rejections are typically not systematically recorded and needed to be compiled manually
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for the purpose of this survey. Depending on the available resources and the existing
format of the records, some municipalities simply did not have the means to respond.
Politics may have played another role. Naturalizations being a highly controversial issue
in Switzerland, all municipalites were assured absolute anonymity. Even so, it is possible
that some municipalities may have self-selected into abstaining.
The two most obvious marginalized countries of origin in Switzerland are Turkey and
former Yugoslavia.10 Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) have demonstrated that appli-
cants from other countries have been shown to be less likely to be rejected. I follow their
grouping of country of origin and classify two European comparison groups. Germany,
France, and Great Britain comprise the richer northwestern group. I have narrowed
the group to these countries because they provide a sensible number of observations in
all municipalities. Italy, Portugal, and Spain make up the southern, less a­ uent Eu-
ropean group. These two European groups were part of di¤erent immigration waves.
The southern group settled in the 1970s in great numbers. The northwestern group has
been particularly on the move since the 2000s. This aggregation by country of origin
raises the number of categorical observations and facilitates the implementation of the
empirical test. The combined rejections of the southern group allow for the juxtaposition
to Turkish and Yugoslavian rejections. On their own, Italy, Portugal, and Spain do not
provide enough data. Dearth of observations is also the reason why no other countries
have not been included into the empirical analysis.
10The countries of former Yugoslavia are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Mon-
tenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia. In what follows, I will simply write Yugoslavia.
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Table 1: Municipal Rejection Rates in Percent, by Applicant Group and Year
Year
Mun. Group 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
A Yu 49 100 100 90 88 - - 0 16 10 3 2 0 0
(d) (b) (c) (d) (c) (a) (a) (b) (c) (d) (c) (d) (d) (d)
Turkey 100 100 100 83 - - - - 0 0 - 0 0 0
(b) (b) (b) (b) (a) (a) (a) (a) (b) (b) (a) (b) (b) (b)
South 26 0 43 67 42 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(c) (b) (b) (c) (c) (a) (a) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b)
North - - - 50 0 - - - 0 - 0 0 - 0
(a) (a) (a) (b) (b) (a) (a) (a) (b) (a) (b) (b) (a) (b)
B Yu 30 28 23 26 23 19 12 11 13 17 15 15 18 16
(c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d)
Turkey 19 7 7 11 18 6 0 6 9 6 7 3 7 12
(c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (d) (c) (d) (d) (d)
South 8 7 4 0 4 0 4 0 7 6 3 5 5 6
(c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (d) (c) (d) (d) (d)
North 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 14 13 10
(b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (c) (c) (c)
C Yu 42 40 48 35 48 19 5 4 5 8 11 12 17 20
(d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d)
Turkey 27 29 25 17 23 10 15 13 15 18 15 19 23 25
(c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (d) (d) (d) (d)
South 14 12 7 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 5
(c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (d)
North 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(b) (b) (b) (c) (b) (b) (b) (b) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (d)
D Yu 32 31 30 33 32 25 14 17 17 24 22 22 28 27
(c) (d) (c) (c) (c) (d) (c) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d)
Turkey 20 25 18 23 22 14 0 8 7 17 13 14 15 15
(c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d)
South 9 13 12 10 14 6 0 0 5 4 11 11 12 11
(c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (d) (d) (d) (d)
North 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0
(b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (c) (c) (c)
19
Table 1 Continued: Municipal Rejection Rates in Percent, by Applicant Group and Year
Year
Mun. Group 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
E Yu 17 24 20 17 21 15 14 18 14 17 17 18 22 22
(d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d)
Turkey 0 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 4 5 3
(b) (c) (b) (c) (b) (b) (c) (c) (b) (b) (c) (c) (c) (d)
South 8 7 8 7 7 4 4 5 3 5 4 6 7 8
(d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d)
North 19 18 21 21 19 14 17 16 18 20 23 23 24 24
(d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d) (d)
F Yu 12 15 13 19 11 11 12 15 11 15 11 15 16 11
(c) (b) (c) (b) (c) (b) (c) (b) (c) (b) (b) (b) (c) (c)
Turkey 7 14 0 0 8 0 8 0 0 7 0 0 10 6
(c) (b) (c) (b) (c) (b) (c) (b) (c) (b) (b) (b) (c) (c)
South 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(b) (c) (b) (c) (b) (b) (b) (c) (b) (c) (b) (c) (c) (c)
North 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
(b) (b) (a) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (c) (b) (a) (b) (b)
Note: To preserve anonymity, the letters in the parentheses denote the categories within which the corresponding
number of observations falls: a (no observation), b (1-10 observations), c (11-30), d (> 30).
Table 1 shows, in percent, the rejection rates for the six municipalities A to F for
the years 1998 to 2011, classied by applicant group. For example, in municipality B
in 2002 applicants from Yugoslavia were rejected at a rate of 23 percent. Figure A1 in
the appendix and, by taking two examples, Figure 1 and 2 visualize these data. Table
2 conates, for each applicant group and municipality, the combined rejection rates for
entire period. For example, from 1998-2011 applications from the southern European
group in municipality E got rejected at a rate of six percent. Taken together, in the
six municipalities 1,516 out of 11,345 applications, or roughly 13%, were rejected during
the 14 years of observation. The municipalities di¤er in their number of applications.
Municipality E has the highest number of observations with over 5,000 recorded appli-
cations, accounting for almost half of the observations in the data set. Municipality A
has less than 600 observations. By and large, Yugoslavians and Turks apply in greater
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numbers than the two European groups. Their rates are di¤erent, too. Turks and Yu-
goslavians typically exhibit the highest rejection rates, broadly ranging from 10% to 40%
over the years, with Yugoslavians consistently being rejected at a higher rate. Applicants
from the northwestern European group usually do not have to fear rejections, except in
municipality E, where they even join the ranks of the Yugoslavian rates. Because munic-
ipality E also provides the highest number of observations in the data set, the aggregated
rejection rates over all municipalities for the northwestern group is higher than for the
southern group. In general, however, the southern group is situated slightly above the
northwestern group on an annual basis in the other municipalities. There seems to be
another overarching ranking pattern in the rejection rates. There seems to be heterogene-
ity between municipalities, too. Across the board, municipality F does not reject often.
Municipality D, in contrast, seems to be more restrictive in general. This dovetails with
the conclusions from Section 2.
Table 2: Aggregated Rejection Rates in Percent, 1998-2011
By Municipality
Applicant Group A B C D E F All Municipalities
Yu 32 18 20 25 18 14 21
(g) (g) (h) (g) (h) (g) (3,632)
Turkey 59 8 20 16 3 5 13
(c) (g) (f) (g) (f) (f) (1,537)
South 29 5 4 8 6 0 6
(e) (g) (f) (g) (j) (f) (4,345)
North 10 7 5 1 20 0 16
(b) (e) (f) (e) (i) (d) (1,831)
All Applicants 32 11 15 17 11 9 13
(g) (i) (i) (i) (k) (h) (11,345)
Note: To preserve anonymity, the letters in the municipality-specic parantheses denote the categories within which
the corresponding number of observations falls: a (no observation), b (1-10 observations), c (11-30), d (31-70), e (71-150),
f (151-310), g (311-630), h (631-1270), i (1271-2550), j (2551-5110), k (> 5111). In the other parentheses, the number of
observations are shown.
The time trends indicate an impact of the 2003 ruling. This is especially visible
21
in municipality, which enforced extreme rejection rates before 2003. Turkish and Yu-
goslavian applicants often got rejected altogether in large numbers, their rates barely
indistinguishable from one another. All applications were put on hold in 2003 and 2004;
afterwards hardly any applications got rejected anymore. Through particularly striking
there, this general observation is not restricted to municipality A. In 2003 and 2004,
rejection rates fell in most municipalities, a break exploited in the next sections test for
prejudice. In the years after, the rates began to rise again. This later increase coincides
with an increase in the number of applications, which started around 2007. In contrast,
the earlier years show a fairly consistent number of applications per year for any given
combination of municipality and applicant group.
5 Empirical Analysis
The decision by the courts in 2003 made local naturalization practices the center of public
attention. Municipalities, now under close scrutiny, suddenly risked sharp criticism for
the handling of their naturalization applications. Rejecting applicants became more
risky. In terms of the model, the cost of mistakenly naturalizing unqualied applicants
decreased. In equation (2), this exogenous shock raised the signal threshold (c; e) and
thus decreased the average rejection rate in equation (4). In turn, this implies an increase
in the naturalization rate, a hypothesis supported by the ndings in Hainmueller and
Hangartner (2017). Against that background, the test for prejudice proposed in Section
3.3 predicts that if a municipality is unprejudiced, the exogenous shock should not change
the ranking of its rejection rates by applicant group.
I rst test whether there is a statistically signicant break in rejection rates upon
the decision of the courts. To that end, for each applicant group in every municipality I
calculate the aggregate rejection rates from 1998-2002 and 2004-2006, respectively. After
2007, the number of applications began to rise, which could indicate a change of quality
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in the pool of applicants. As in Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) and Anwar and Fang
(2006), aggregating over time increases the number of observations for the empirical test
to a su¢ cient frequency. Both the number of applications and the rejection rates are
stable within these respective periods, which increases our condence that there are no
changes in the quality of the applicant pools that could be confounding the results.
I refrain from a using parametric test, which is only valid if the systematic component
and distribution of the error component of the model are correctly specied. A simple
Pearson 2 test of independence yields more robust results. I calculate the p-values under
the null hypothesis that for each applicant group in every municipality the rejection rates
before and after 2003 are equal. That is, I compare the proportions of granted to rejected
applicants against the proportion that would be expected under the null hypothesis:
X
S
X
Y
=

\O (e; Y )  \E (e; Y )
2
\E (e; Y )
 2 (1)
S 2 fgranted; rejectedg describes the two possible application outcomes, \O (e; Y ) is
the estimated observed average frequency of (granted or rejected) applications, Y 2
f1998  2002; 2004  2006g denotes the two time periods, and \E (e; Y ) is the estimated
expected frequency under the null hypothesis of independence. In this 2x2 contingency
table, the test statistic will be drawn from a 2 distribution with one degree of freedom.
The fth and and tenth column in Table 3, "p-value", show the levels of statistical
signicance from this test. Except in municipality E, I drop the northern group from the
tests because of its low frequencies. In all tested cases, the rates decreased or remained
constant after the break. The null is rejected in 11 out of 19 tests, suggesting that, by and
large, the rejection rates decreased signicantly during the three years after the ruling.
For each municipality, I proceed to test for statistically signicant rankings between
the applicant groups before and after the break, respectively. For these rank tests, I also
employ the non-parametric Pearson 2 test of independence. In Table 3, the subpanels
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in each municipality panel rst test the null hypothesis that all applicant groups in that
municipality exhibit equal rejection rates; more precisely, that the rejection rates are
independent of applicant group. For the 1998-2002 period, the null that the rates are
equal is rejected in all municipalities. During the second period, the null is rejected in
four of the six municipalities. Taken together, this makes it unlikely that rejections are
independent of applicant group. The next three lines (in municipality E: six lines) in
each municipalitys subpanel test the pairwise rank orders of each combination of the
applicant groups. In municipality D, for example, the null hypothesis that in the 2002-
2004 period the rejection rates of Yugoslavian (16%) and Turkish applicants (5%) are
equal is rejected at a ve percent level of signicance.
Figure 1: Annual Rejection Rates in Municipality D, by Country of Origin
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Let us take a closer look at municipalites D and C. Figure 1 visualizes the annual
rejection rates by applicant group for municipality D. Throughout the years, the rejec-
tion rates by applicants from Yugoslavia are the highest among all the depicted groups.
Applicants from the southern group consistently show the lowest rejection rates. Turkish
rejection rates fall in between. There is a distinct visual rank order of the rejection rates,
an order which does not change with the drop in 2003. Statistics support the visual
impression. The subpanel for municipality D in Table 3 rejects the null for all three
pairwise comparisons of the applicant groups in both periods. On the basis of the con-
ceptual framework outlined in Section 3 we therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no prejudice in municipality D.
Figure 2: Annual Rejection Rates in Municipality C, by Country of Origin
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Figure 2 pictures the development in municipality C. In contrast to the consistent
rank order in municipality D, the gure reveals a reversal of the Yugoslavian and Turkish
rank orders upon 2003. Table 3 shows that the rejection rate among applicants from
Yugoslavia amounted to 42% before the break, only to drop to 5% afterwards. The
Turkish rejection rate dropped as well, from 24% to 17%, but not enough to make up
the sharp descent of the Yugoslavian rate. This rank reversal is statistically signicant.
The empirical test rejects the null that the rejections rates are equal before the break
(after the break) at a one percent (ve percent) level of signicance. On that account,
using the model we can conclude that, in this data set, there is evidence of prejudice in
municipality C.
In a cross-sectional comparison of municipalities, we would neither be able to pinpoint
the responsible municipality nor the discriminated applicant group. For the test for
prejudice is a relative one, able to detect empirical patterns that are inconsistent with the
assumption of unprejudiced municipalities. The within-municipality comparison upon
the ruling of the courts overcomes both issues. The responsible municipality is obvious.
And because the ruling raised the costs of prejudice, it is straightforward that, within
the context of the model, municipality C used to be prejudiced against applicants from
Yugoslavia before 2003.
The empirical results from the other municipalities do not point towards prejudice.
Municipality A is an outlier in this analysis. The 2003 ruling brought practically brought
about a complete reversal of the rejection rates, from all out to all in. But the data fail to
provide a generally distinguishable rank order. Municipality B reveals an evident break
only for the Yugoslavian rates, which consistently rank higher than the southern rates. In
municipality E, we can conclude breaks for both the Yugoslavian and southern rate and
can di¤erentiate a combined rank order: Yugoslavian and northwestern applicants rank
higher than Turkish and southern applicants in both periods. Finally, the Yugoslavian
rate in municipality F ranks highest throughout. The Turkish rate hovers between the
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Yugoslavian one and the southern one, the latter being zero in every year. Although
rankable, none of them reveal a statistically signicant break in 2003.
Table 3: Mean Rejection Rates in Percent and Rank Order Tests
Rates and Ranks Rates and Ranks
Mun. Group(s) 98-02 04-06 p-value Mun. Group(s) 98-02 04-06 p-value
A Yu 82 11 <0.001 D Yu 32 16 <0.1
Turkey 90 0 <0.05 Turkey 22 5 <0.01
South 43 0 <0.1 South 12 2 <0.05
p-value p-value
Yu=T=S <0.001 0.68 Yu=T=S <0.001 <0.01
Yu=T 0.51 0.71 Yu=T <0.1 <0.05
Yu=S <0.001 0.42 Yu=S <0.001 <0.01
T=S <0.01 1 T=S <0.1 0.24
B Yu 26 12 <0.05 E Yu 20 15 <0.001
Turkey 12 5 0.45 Turkey 4 0 0.27
South 1 0 0.8 South 7 4 <0.05
p-value North 20 17 0.47
Yu=T=S <0.001 0.17 p-value
Yu=T 0.10 0.32 Yu=T=S=N <0.001 <0.001
Yu=S <0.001 <0.001 Yu=T <0.01 <0.05
T=S 0.11 0.47 Yu=S <0.001 <0.05
C Yu 42 5 <0.001 Yu=N 1 0.58
Turkey 25 14 <0.1 T=S <0.1 0.24
South 10 0 <0.05 T=N <0.01 <0.01
p-value S=N <0.001 <0.001
Yu=T=S <0.001 <0.01 F Yu 14 13 0.80
Yu=T <0.01 <0.05 Turkey 6 6 0.95
Yu=S <0.001 <0.005 South 0 0 1
T=S <0.05 <0.01 p-value
Yu=T=S <0.01 <0.1
Yu=T <0.1 0.24
Yu=S <0.01 <0.05
T=S <0.01 <0.1
Finally, the overall pattern of the data after the break displays a positive relationship
between the number of applications and the rejection rate. Some years after the court
ruling, more and more immigrants expressed interest in the Swiss passport. As the
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number of applications rose, the rejection rate increased, too. This nding accords with
the prediction of the model. The expansion of the applicant pool entailed a reduction
in quality at the margin. With a xed signal threshold for naturalization, this change
implies a rise in the rejection rate. At the same time, it implies a rise in the naturalization
rate; an implication which is consistent with the ndings in Hainmueller and Hangartner
(2017).
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes and empirically implements a test for prejudice in naturalizations
based on a theoretical model of regionally deciding councils. The model uses rejection
rates, classied by applicant group, as an indicator of prejudice. The test assesses the
hypothesis that applicants striving for citizenship in their administrative division are
measured by the same local yardstick. Using Switzerland as a case study, I collect an
original data set on rejection rates from six large municipalities and exploit a landmark
ruling in naturalization law in 2003, a ruling that exogenously raised the costs of rejecting
applicants. According to the test, there is bias against applicants from former Yugoslavia
in one of the six municipalities. In the other ve, the test cannot reject the hypothesis
of no prejudice. In addition, I provide empirical evidence consistent with a testable
implication of the model, lending credibility to its descriptive validity.
One drawback in the existing research on naturalization is a lack of understanding
about the mechanism driving the naturalization decision. That process has been looked
on as a black box. My model aims to provide a generalizable comprehension of how
rejection outcomes, and hence successful naturalizations, might be determined from the
behavior of the deciding councils. The inference of eligibility for naturalization can take
many forms, some of which are likely not observable to researchers. The implication is
that even strong disparities in rejection rates when controlled for observable character-
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istics may not prove prejudice. In contrast to a simple empirical analysis, the model
helps understand how the observed outcomes have come about and provides a frame to
interpret these data.
This may shed new light on existing conclusions of naturalization outcomes. Hain-
mueller and Hangartner (2017), for example, attribute the rise in naturalization rates
in Switzerland after the 2003 ruling to discriminatory preferences by the the previous
electorate. This conclusion emanates from the observation that for Turkish and former
Yugoslavian applicants, the spike in naturalization rates was more pronounced in munic-
ipalites where the conservative Swiss Peoples Party (SVP) has higher vote shares. The
model developped in this paper illustrates that this share might not necessarily be a "good
proxy for xenophobic preferences" (p.12), preferences which manifest in the indulgence
of prejudiced behavior against immigrants. Instead, the share could reect a universally
conservative state of mind. Just as one would hesitate to conclude that countries which
are more reluctant to naturalize immigrants are prejudiced, the model allows for di¤erent
levels of unprejudiced strictness among regions within a country. In the model this would
imply that decisionmakers lower their required standard of qualication due to the in-
crease in looming public accusation of prejudice. Because the conservative municipalites
lower their bars from higher levels, they start letting through marginalized applicant
groups at a higher rate than lenient municipalities, where the bulk of marginalized appli-
cants had already cleared the bars. Other applicant groups would be less a¤ected overall
because their higher eligibility was never a real issue even in conservative municipalities.
In this sense, this paper proposes an unprejudiced mechanism that is consistent with the
same evidence.
In cross-sectional empirical implementations of the model, councils are not necessarily
facing identical applicant pools. Researchers thus need to empirically verify that on
average the pools of applicants faced by the di¤erent decisionmaking bodies are the
same. This assumption could be ensured by testing variables that proxy for eligibility.
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For example, data from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) would
help answering the question whether students of a given country of origin have equal
educational skill sets in di¤erent regions. Labor force survey or household panel data
could be also used to verify similar eligibility.
I would also like to emphasize that, like in any empirical analysis with observational
data, the test for prejudice proposed in this paper is only valid under certain assumptions.
For example, in the model applicants do not interact strategically with the councils.
One might object that the councils beliefs about the applicants might disincentivize
marginalized groups to invest in integrational capital in the rst place. Such models of
self-fullling prophecy have been discussed by Arrow (1973) and Coate and Loury (1993).
This is a limitation of this study. In ongoing research I address such an extension and
show that under certain conditions, multiple equilibria may arise in which the branch of
rank order tests to which my test belongs may not be valid (Ili´c, 2016).
Finally, the conclusions about prejudice in this empirical analysis should be treated
with mindful caution. The empirical data are novel and were raised manually, thus lacking
rigorous validation and standardization. My hope is that the approach used in this paper
will lead the responsible authorities to understand the types of data required to answer
questions about prejudice in naturalization. Ideally, there would be a central register
where naturalization applications, their subsequent decisions, and relevant individual
information about the applicants are being led. Another helpful instrument would be the
introduction of complementary standardized naturalization achievement test nationwide,
which would provide an additional measure for comparing the relative eligibility of the
applicant groups.
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7 Appendix
Figure A1: Annual Rejection Rates in all Municipalities, by Country of Origin
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